17/11/2019
High Level Mission from Brussels to Khartoum, 30-31 October 2019.
Summary:
On 30 and 31 October 2019 a high level mission from Brussels visited Khartoum. The mission comprised Mr. Jean-Christophe Belliard, Deputy Secretary-General and Director-General for Political Affairs in EEAS, Mr. Koen Doens, Director-General DEVCO and Alexander Rondos, EUSR for the Horn of Africa. Meetings were held with the Prime Minister of the Interim government of Sudan, Mr. Abdalla Hamdok, several ministers in his cabinet (Foreign Affairs, Justice, Industry and Trade-in absence of minister of Finance-, Social Development and Labour), representatives of the judiciary (Chief Justice, Attorney-General), representatives of the Forces of Freedom and Change, representatives of other international partners and the deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (alias Hemidti).
Assessment and Follow-up:
1. In all encounters it became apparent that the process of transition to a democratic dispensation is urgent and needs strong political and financial international support. There is a unique window of opportunity to turn this peaceful democratic transition into a sustainable success, which could become a blueprint example for the wider region and indeed the whole of Africa. History is being made, and it requires and deserves our support.
2. The window, however, may be closing soon. The pressures are indeed building up. The economic situation in the country is further deteriorating and popular support may be wining soon as a result. Moreover, internal resistance from old guard quarters may find more and more opportunities to regroup and organise resistance, as progress towards democratisation still lacks visible and tangible results.
3. It is therefore of utmost importance to take swift action to identify the most urgent needs and to support quick-win confidence building results. Apart from major financing needs, it became clear that the government lacks capacity in important areas, such as economic policy making in various ministries and (transitional) justice, and that the top level of the ministries is not necessarily supported by equally competent and transition-oriented lower management.
4. Success will require the international community to mobilize and coordinate itself, both in political, financial and technical terms, in order to boost government capacity and credibility. Whilst the EU alone does not have the necessary firepower to meet the needs, the EU has a unique opportunity to take a leading role in this urgent process, in close cooperation with UK and USA, in order to avoid a business-as-usual approach. The multilateral financial institutions, particularly the IMF, remain reluctant to engage intensively with the transitional government, in absence of substantial financial support from the donor community. Such financial support suffers from continued uncertainty regarding Sudan being listed as a State Supporting Terrorism. It also suffers a lack of capacity in the government to design a convincing economic plan which addresses in sufficient detail the short term, medium term and long term goals, the related obstacles on the way to those goals, and the possible ways to tackle them. This chicken-and-egg situation needs to be broken, and the delegation pointed at various instances to the importance of focussing on possible actions which are not hampered by Sudan being on the SST list, which would provide important confidence-building results for the transition process and the success of government in pursuing it, and could prove useful in the dialogue with the US government on the SSTL.
5. The follow-up of this high level visit from Brussels will be as follows:
o Preparation of the visit of Prime Minister Hamdok to Brussels 11 November to meet the EU Foreign Affairs Council and members of the incoming EU leadership; it will be crucial to show that the EU at the highest level stands behind the Prime Minister;
o High-level steer and active engagement at HQ level must be sustained, notably by frequent presence of the EUSR;
o Immediate engagement with World Bank and UN system, locally in Khartoum but especially at HQ level, to embark upon a RPBA at the shortest possible notice, and work with the government on a more detailed economic programme ("business plan") responding to immediate and medium-term challenges;
o Active engagement with Norway, in view of the preparation of the Friends of Sudan meeting in December in Khartoum. This is a high risk event, if the outcome lacks tangible results for the Prime Minister to show. It will fall sort of a major donors conference, but it should be seen whether it can build on the RPBA and present some early harvest. The EU's 100 MEUR should be ready for publication by then.
o Preparation of a concerted donor overview of currently implemented and planned donor interventions in support of the transition process, both to allow the government to communicate better about what it manages to achieve, and to show that the international community is backing up the government, and to ensure that support being given is better coordinated and focussed than is the case now and without overlaps;
o Consultation with IMF at all possible levels on the road map to a Staff Monitored Programme, in view of the planned IMF mission in November, in order to encourage the launch of a full diagnostic (in Feb/March), leading to a macro-economic reform plan of 6 months, which would then form the basis for a request for funding in view of a SMP. This is a must as it is the essential catalyst for resource mobilisation to support the (very costly) economic reform measures as part of the transition process;
o Need to look at the sequencing between on the one hand the willingness of the international community to engage with the government and produce tangible results and on the other hand the foreseen events, notably the December Friends of Sudan meeting and the possible April Donor Conference;
o Identification of capacity needs in the Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Finance and possibly also in the Judiciary. Donor consultation and coordination is particularly useful in this area, as different initiatives are already underway.
Detail:
• The overall goal of the mission was to:
o learn about the current state of play in the democratic transition of Sudan;
o demonstrate political support to the transitional government, and;
o identify how the EU can best support this all important political, economic and social process.
• In his meeting with the delegation, Prime Minister Hamdok expressed disappointment about the fact that the Friends of Sudan in Washington earlier this month had decided to organize a donor conference only in April 2020, which he deemed to be reflecting a lack of the sense of urgency in the international community. The delegation was able to explain, that having a donor conference earlier that April would risk to lead to failure for lack of insight in concrete needs priorities and insufficient mobilization of resources from various sources.
• The delegation repeated the invitation for the Prime Minister to visit Brussels to meet the Foreign Affairs Council on 11 November, by handing over an advance copy of the invitation letter from HRVP Mogherini. It also offers the opportunity to meet with incoming EU leadership.
• PM Hamdok confirmed that he intends to accept the invitation. However, he also mentioned that he needs to carefully plan his travel abroad. In this context he also referred to an invitation he received to travel to Washington early December. The delegation also mentioned the need for the transitional government to appoint a new ambassador to Brussels as soon as possible.
• Hamdok stressed with the delegation that there is good and constructive collaboration with the military participation in the sovereign council and in the transitional government. He was confident that the military is serious about the transition to a democratic dispensation.
• The delegation stressed with the Prime Minister that the time until April 2020 should be put to good use in assessing the priority needs and achieving quick-win, confidence-building results to bolster national and international support for the transition process. These should be brought together in a comprehensive 'business plan' underpinning the transition in political, economic and social terms. Reference was also made to the list of 20 priority projects presented by the Minister of Finance to the Friends of Sudan in Washington. Starting implementing these activities was mentioned as an important confidence building policy measure. The delegation underlined the need for the government to take a visible and commanding lead in this process.
• The delegation offered to fast-track a tripartite ''Recovery and Peace Building Assessment'', to be carried out well before the April 2020 donor conference, jointly by EU, World Bank and the UN. The Prime Minister agreed to submit a request for such an assessment at shortest possible notice. This would also help to provide the much needed Sudanese ownership and government leadership in the transition process and the international support to it.
• Meetings with Ministers of Justice, Social Development and Labour, Industry and Trade and the Under Secretary of Finance boosted confidence by the delegation that Hamdok's cabinet harbours highly competent, well motivated and inspiring officials, thoroughly committed to the transition agenda.
• The Minister of Justice as well as the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General impressed upon the delegation that important legal and judicial reforms and legislation are underway. The events of 3 June have now been entrusted to an independent investigation committee of solid reputation; a transitional justice committee and a legal reform committee are to start work soon and various pieces of discriminatory and repressive legislation are being repealed. Thus, the legal framework is being seriously reformed to be instrumental in the success of the transition to a peaceful democratic dispensation with due respect for rule of law, human rights and equality for all.
• In a long conversation in his private residence, the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Mohammed Daglo (a.k.a. Hemidti) gave a long historical account of developments which ultimate led to the ousting of former President Bashir, on 11 April 2019. He stressed that he had no other ambition than to preserve peace and security in the whole region and went out of his way to state that he was in no way involved in the events of 3 June, when demonstrators were violently removed from the sit-in area in front of the Military Headquarters, leading to unnecessary loss of life. Daglo confirmed that Sudanese forces are gradually being withdrawn from Yemen. Reportedly 10,000 troops have already returned recently and will not be replaced. To the surprise of the delegation he stated that Sudanese forces in Yemen are not only Rapid Support Forces, but also Sudanese Armed Forces.
• Representatives of the Forces of Freedom and Change called upon the international community to continue support for the transition process and particularly for the democratisation of Sudan. It was concretely suggested that the international community facilitates independent monitoring of the progress, results and challenges of the process towards the introduction of a democratic dispensation.
• Some FFC referred to involvement of EU in the migration / Khartoum Process (eg ROCK) with some criticism. The Khartoum Delegation will seek a meeting with relevant FFC members to clarify what EU is doing.
• In consultations with other donor parties (EU HOMs, Troika, World Bank, IMF, AfDB, UN system) it became clear to the delegation that there is need for more coordination amongst international partners and leadership and ownership from the Sudanese transitional government, as there is a lack of concerted action and resource mobilisation to support the transition agenda. The delegation observed that this situation risks loss of confidence in the success of the fundamental changes towards democratisation which have started in April 2019. The Sudan International Partners Forum (where EU is member of Steering Committee) may serve the platform for this coordination. On the government side it appears that MOFEP is establishing a structure within this ministry to complement the SIPF.
• In this respect the delegation also addressed with various interlocutors the necessary sequencing of measures in the short, medium and long term. Particularly short term measures should be used to build confidence and credibility for the process, whereas the medium term should see a beginning of the economic reform necessary for recovery, together with mitigating measures such as social safety nets and steps towards debt relief. For the long term transition towards a democratic dispensation support for preparation and organization of elections, censuses and governance reform should be part of the plan.
• At different occasions, the delegation discussed the government's intention to ratify the Cotonou Agreement with different interlocutors. The advantages of ratification are limited, as the remaining financial envelope of EDF is very limited. Moreover, political complications may emerge as full ratification by all ACP partners is required. More focus should be put on making sure that Sudan can be full fledged party to the successor agreement, which is envisaged to be concluded in the second semester of 2020. The delegation nevertheless confirmed to await the final decision by the transitional government on Cotonou ratification.
Sign-off: Jean-Christophe Belliard (EEAS), Koen Doens (DEVCO), Alexander Rondos (EUSR), Robert van den Dool (HoD).
